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Recent advances in market design have called for a better understanding of how in-
stitutions choose, or how they should choose, when faced with a set of alternatives.
For example, in the context of assigning students to schools, it is important to under-
stand the structure of plausible choice rules a school can use as an admissions policy.
Although the relevant restrictions on choice rules vary across applications, capacity-
filling and substitutable choice rules remain as the general prominent class. In this
study, we provide a new representation result for capacity-filling and substitutable
choice rules.
We consider a decision maker who has a capacity constraint and encounters
choice problems each of which consists of a choice set. A choice rule, at each possi-
ble choice problem, chooses some alternatives from the choice set without exceeding
the capacity. A choice rule is capacity-filling if it fills the capacity whenever possible,
and accepts all alternatives from a choice set that includes no more alternatives than
the capacity. Capacity-filling is a natural restriction in many applications where insti-
tutions prefer to fill their positions whenever possible.1 A choice rule is substitutable
if it chooses an alternative from a choice set whenever the alternative is chosen from
a larger choice set.2 That is, no alternative should be chosen because it complements
another alternative. Substitutability has been a standard requirement in the market
design literature following the seminal work of Kelso and Crawford (1982).3 In the
context of matching problems, Alkan (2001) presents the first model that studies
1In the matching literature, capacity-filling is also referred to as acceptance, although the capacity-
filling terminology has been increasingly popular in the recent literature. Alkan (2001) is the first
study which uses the “filling” terminology where he uses the term quota filling.
2In the revealed preference literature, substitutability is also referred to as independence of irrelevant
alternatives, Chernoff ’s condition or Sen’s property α.
3Beyond its normative appeal, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) show that substitutability of choice
rules guarantees the existence of a stable matching, which is a central desideratum for applications.
Hatfield and Kojima (2008) show that substitutability of choice rules is an “almost necessary” con-
dition for the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of stable allocations. Similarly, several
classical results of matching literature have been generalized with substitutable choice rules (Roth and
Sotomayor (1990), Alkan and Gale (2003), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)).
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substitutable choice rules together with capacity-filling.
Given capacity q, we say that a choice rule has a maximizer-collecting (MC) rep-
resentation of size m, or simply called m-maximizer-collecting, if there exists a list of
m priority orderings4 such that all alternatives are chosen from each choice set that
contains at most q alternatives, and the choice from each choice set that contains
more than q alternatives is obtainable by collecting the maximizers of the priority or-
derings. It follows from Aizerman and Malishevski (1981) that each capacity-filling
and substitutable choice rule has an MC representation.5 However, the size of a small-
est size MC representation of a choice rule and how to construct such a representation
have been unknown.
We introduce the concept of a “critical set”, which turns out to determine the
minimal number of priority orderings required for an MC representation of a capacity-
filling and substitutable choice rule. Given a choice rule, a choice set is a critical set
if the number of alternatives in the choice set is equal to the capacity, and there ex-
ists an alternative that is chosen whenever added to the choice set, but no longer
chosen whenever any other alternative is added afterwards (see Section 1 for a for-
mal definition). In Theorem 1, we constructively prove that for each capacity-filling
and substitutable choice rule, the number of priority orderings in its smallest size MC
representation is equal to the number of its critical sets.
Well-known examples of capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules include
responsive choice rules which have been studied particularly in the two-sided match-
ing context (Gale and Shapley, 1962). A choice rule is responsive if there exists a
priority ordering such that the choice from each choice set is obtainable by choosing
the highest priority alternatives until the capacity is reached or no alternative is left.
In Proposition 2, we show that the upper bound on the number of critical sets is
achieved by responsive choice rules. That is, the size of the smallest size MC repre-
4A priority ordering is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation over all possible
alternatives.
5Aizerman and Malishevski (1981) provide their representation result for path independent choice
rules (Plott, 1973). It is known that capacity-filling and substitutability imply path independence (see
Footnote 9 for more details).
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sentation rendered by responsive choice rules is largest among all capacity-filling and
substitutable choice rules.
We also analyze choice rules with MC representations of the size equal to the
capacity q. For applications, q-MC choice rules have a particular appeal. If a choice
rule is q-MC, then each one of the q priority orderings in its MC representation can
be interpreted as a separate admission criterion for each available position. Put dif-
ferently, the admission criterion for each position is represented by the associated
priority ordering in the MC representation of size q. However, in Theorem 3, we
show that if the capacity is greater than three and the number of alternatives ex-
ceeds the capacity by at least two, then no capacity-filling and substitutable choice
rule has an MC representation of size q.
1.1 Related Literature
Capacity-filling together with substitutability imply path independence (Plott, 1973),
which requires that if the choice set is “split up” into smaller sets, and if the choices
from the smaller sets are collected and a choice is made from the collection, the
final result should be the same as the choice from the original choice set. Among
others, Plott (1973), Moulin (1985), Johnson (1990), and Johnson (1995) study the
structure of path independent choice rules. Johnson and Dean (2001) and Koshevoy
(1999) provide a lattice theoretic characterization of path independent choice rules.6
Chambers and Yenmez (2017) use the MC representation of path independent choice
rules to provide a new proof of a classical existence result for stable matching and a
new result on welfare effects of expanding the choice rules in the matching context.
Kojima and Manea (2010), Ehlers and Klaus (2014), and Ehlers and Klaus (2016)
characterize deferred acceptance mechanisms where each school has a choice rule
that satisfies capacity-filling and substitutability. Although the structure of capacity-
filling and substitutable choice rules and their relation to matching mechanisms have
been extensively studied, there is no direct implication of these studies for our con-
6They show that choice lattices associated with these rules constitute the class of lower locally
distributive lattices.
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struction of priority orderings that render a smallest size MC representation.
Cherepanov et al. (2013) analyze a two-stage choice model, in which an agent
first shortlists alternatives that are optimal according to at least one of his rationales,
which is an asymetric binary relation, and then singles out an alternative by maximiz-
ing a preference order.7 They analyze choice functions that single out an alternative
from each choice set. In contrast, we consider choice rules that can be represented
by collecting alternatives that are optimal according to a priority ordering, which is
a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation. They put additional struc-
ture on their representations by focusing on the maximality of the set of shortlisted
alternatives,8 which implicitly requires a possible increase in the number of used ra-
tionales. Here, we are interested in obtaining a minimal size representation, which
goes in the opposite direction. Therefore, there is no direct implication of their results
for our analysis.
As for our analysis of q-MC choice rules, the closest study is by Eliaz et al. (2011),
who axiomatically analyze a decision maker who has in mind two orderings and
chooses one or two alternatives that are maximizers of these orderings. This pro-
cedure, called top-and-the-top, yields a distinct pair of alternatives from each choice
set, only if the second ordering is the inverse of the first ordering. In contrast, for any
given capacity q, a q-MC choice rule chooses a set of q alternatives from each choice
set that contains at least q alternatives.
2 Preliminaries
Let A be a nonempty finite set of n alternatives and let A denote the set of all
nonempty subsets of A. A choice rule C : A → A associates with each choice
set S ∈ A, a nonempty set of alternatives C(S) ⊆ S. Let q ∈ {1, . . . , n} be a given
capacity. We analyze choice rules that have the following two properties, which are
well-known in the literature.
7This specified model is called “order rationalization”.
8This is called “the minimum constraint theory of rationalization”.
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Capacity-filling: For given capacity q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, an alternative is rejected from a
choice set at a capacity q only if the capacity is full. Formally, for each S ∈ A,
|C(S)| = min{|S|, q}.
Substitutability: If an alternative is chosen from a choice set, then it is also chosen
from any subset of the choice set that contains the alternative. Formally, for each
S, T ∈ A such that T ⊆ S and a ∈ T ,
if a ∈ C(S), then a ∈ C(T ).
Each capacity-filling choice rule C satisfies substitutability if and only if C satis-
fies path independence: for each S, S ′ ∈ A, C(S ∪ S ′) = C(C(S) ∪ C(S ′)).9 In plain
words, path independence requires that if the choice set is “split up” into smaller sets,
and if the choices from the smaller sets are collected and a choice is made from the
collection, the final result should be the same as the choice from the original choice
set (Plott, 1973).
The fact that capacity-filling together with substitutability imply path-
independence follows from two facts. The first fact is that a choice rule is path-
independent if and only if it is substitutable and satisfies irrelevance of rejected alter-
natives (IRA) (Aizerman and Malishevski, 1981). IRA requires that for all S, S ′ ∈ A,
C(S) ⊆ S ′ ⊆ S implies C(S) = C(S ′). The second fact is that capacity-filling together
with substitutability imply IRA. Given S, S ′ ∈ A such that C(S) ⊆ S ′ ⊆ S, substi-
tutability implies that C(S) ⊆ C(S ′) and capacity-filling implies that |C(S)| ≥ |C(S ′)|,
which together imply that C(S) = C(S ′).
Aizerman and Malishevski (1981) show that a choice rule is path independent
if and only if there exists a list of priority orderings such that the choice from each
choice set is the union of the highest priority alternatives in the priority orderings.10
Next, we formally define and add more structure on these choice rules that we call
MC choice rules.
9This equivalence is also noted in Remark 1 of Doğan and Klaus (2018), and it follows from Lemma
1 of Ehlers and Klaus (2016) together with Corollary 2 of Aizerman and Malishevski (1981).
10In the words of Aizerman and Malishevski (1981), each path independent choice rule is generable
by some mechanism of collected extremal choice.
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A priority ordering  is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary rela-
tion over A. A priority profile π = (1, . . . ,m), for some m ∈ N, is an ordered list
of m distinct priority orderings. Let Π denote the set of all priority profiles. Given
S ∈ A and a priority ordering , let max(S,) = {a ∈ S : ∀b ∈ S \ {a}, a  b}.
A choice rule C has a maximizer-collecting (MC) representation of size m ∈ N
(or simply m-maximizer-collecting) if there exists (1, . . . ,m) ∈ Π such that for
each S ∈ A with |S| ≤ q, C(S) = S, and for each S ∈ A with |S| > q, C(S) is





Next, we give examples of well-known capacity-filling and substitutable choice
rules used in school choice applications.
Example 1 A choice rule C is responsive if there exists a priority ordering  such
that for each S ∈ A, C(S) is obtained by choosing the highest -priority alternatives
until the capacity q is reached or no alternative is left.12 Responsive choice rules
have been studied particularly in the two-sided matching context (Gale and Shapley,
1962). The school choice literature, starting with the seminal study by Abdulka-
diroğlu and Sönmez (2003), has widely focused on problems where each school is
endowed with a responsive choice rule.
Example 2 A choice rule C is lexicographic if there exists a list of priority orderings
(1, . . . ,q) ∈ Π such that for each choice set S ∈ A, C(S) is obtained by choosing
the highest 1-priority alternative in S, then choosing the highest 2-priority alterna-
tive among the remaining alternatives, and so on until q alternatives are chosen or no
alternative is left. As argued in detail by Kominers and Sönmez (2016), lexicographic
choice rules have been particularly useful in designing allocation mechanisms for
11An alternative representation would require that for each S ∈ A with |S| ≤ q, C(S) =
⋃
i∈{1,...,m} max(S,i). See Section 3 Remark 1 for a discussion on such an alternative representation.
12Chambers and Yenmez (2018) show that a choice rule satisfies capacity-filling and the weakened
weak axiom of revealed priority (WWARP) if and only if it is responsive.
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school choice to achieve diversity.13
Example 3 Echenique and Yenmez (2015) consider a school choice problem in
which students are partitioned into different types, each type t has its reserved seats,
and there is a common priority ordering , such as exam scores, that ranks all the
students. A choice rule is generated by reserves for priority  if for each type
t, the highest priority students among type-t students are chosen until the reserves
for type t are filled, or type-t students are exhausted. Then for the remaining seats,
-best students are chosen until all the seats or students are exhausted, that is stu-
dents of all types compete against each other for all the seats that are not filled in
the first stage. It follows from the characterization of Echenique and Yenmez (2015)
that these choice rules satisfy capacity-filling and substitutability.
3 The representation result
Although it follows from Aizerman and Malishevski (1981) that a capacity-filling
choice rule C satisfies substitutability if and only if C is MC, they remain silent about
the smallest size MC representation and construction of the priority profile. In this
section, we construct a smallest size MC representation of capacity-filling and substi-
tutable choice rules.
We introduce the concept of a critical set for a choice rule, which will be the key
in finding the minimal number of priorities needed for an MC representation.
Definition 1 A choice set T ∈ A is a critical set for C if |T | = q, and there exists an
alternative a /∈ T such that a ∈ C(T ∪{a}) and for each b /∈ T ∪{a}, a /∈ C(T ∪{a, b}).
In plain words, given a choice rule C, a choice set is a critical set for C if the
number of alternatives in the choice set is equal to the capacity and there exists an
alternative not belonging to the choice set that is chosen whenever added to the
choice set, but no longer chosen whenever any other alternative is added afterwards.
13See Doğan et al. (2017) for an axiomatic characterization of lexicographic choice rules in the
school choice context.
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The first result shows that given a capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule,
the number of its critical sets determines the smallest size MC representation of the
choice rule.
Theorem 1 For each capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule C,
i. C has an MC representation of a size equal to the number of its critical sets.
ii. C does not have an MC representation of any size smaller than the number of its
critical sets.
First, we provide a sketch of the proof. The proof uses a specific choice lattice
induced by a given capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule C.14 The choice lattice
is denoted by (M,↘), where M stands for, what we call, the set of maximal choice
sets and ↘ stands for a binary relation that we call the ancestor relation. A choice
set is maximal if there is no larger choice set in which the same set of alternatives is
chosen. A maximal choice set S is a parent of another choice set S ′ if S ′ = S \ {a} for
some a ∈ C(S). A maximal choice set S is an ancestor of another choice set S ′ if there
is a path that connects S to S ′ through parental relations. The collection of maximal
choice sets endowed with the ancestor relation forms our choice lattice associated
with C. For a pictorial representation of (M,↘) see the example in Section 4. In
Lemmas 1-3, we prove some elementary but useful properties of (M,↘).
We observe that we can associate a priority ordering with each path in (M,↘)
that connects A to a maximal choice set of cardinality q. It can be shown that the
collection of all such possible priority orderings provides an MC representation of C,
which in turn provides a proof of the Aizerman and Malishevski (1981) representa-
tion result. However, this obtained representation is not necessarily a minimal size
representation.
The main idea behind the proof is to identify which paths are essential for an
MC representation and how to use them to construct the representation. We discover
14It was first noted by Johnson (1990) that each path independent choice rule induces this specific
choice lattice. Alkan (2001) and Chambers and Yenmez (2017) use a similar choice lattice in their
proofs. We are grateful to Ahmet Alkan for bringing this to our attention.
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that some maximal choice sets that we call “primes” and a collection of paths that
spans all the primes are essential for representing the choice rule. That is, if we pick
a collection of paths in (M,↘) that spans the primes (that is, for each prime, there
is a path that contains the prime), then the associated priority profile represents
the choice rule (see Lemma 7). The rest is to identify a minimal collection of paths
that spans the primes. It turns out that if we collect each path connecting A to a
prime with q alternatives, which we call a prime atom, then this set of paths spans
all the primes.15 Then, by using Lemma 7, we show that the associated priority
profile renders an MC representation of the given choice rule.16 Since each ordering
is associated with a single prime atom, the number of orderings equals the number
of prime atoms. Finally, we show that the number of priority orderings to represent
C is at least the number of prime atoms. The fact that prime atoms coincide with
critical sets (which directly follows from Lemma 4) completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. Part i. Let C be a capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule.
We first make some definitions, then introduce some lemmas, and finally prove the
representation result. Note that C satisfies path independence as well (See Section
2).
A choice set is “maximal” if there is no larger choice set in which the same set
of alternatives is chosen. Formally, a choice set S ∈ A is maximal for C if there is no
larger set T ) S with C(S) = C(T ). Let M denote the set of maximal choice sets for
C.
We define the following binary relations on M. For each S, S ′ ∈ M, S is a
parent of S ′, denoted by S → S ′, if there exists a ∈ C(S) such that S ′ = S \ {a}.
15This conclusion does not hold with arbitrary path independent choice rules. We present an exam-
ple in Footnote 18.
16There are two degree of freedoms in choosing these representations. One is that the last q alter-
natives can be ranked in any way. The other is the following. Suppose there is a prime node S which
does not have a prime parent (if there is no prime, then the representation is unique up to the ranking
of the last q alternatives). Now, there is exactly one priority in the representation that corresponds to
the path containing S. The part of this path which connects S to a prime atom is unique (by Lemma
6). However the remaining part of the path that connects S to the grand set A can be chosen in any
arbitrary way. This is the second degree of freedom in the construction.
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There is a path from S to S ′ if there exists a collection of sets S1, . . . , Sk ∈ M such
that S → S1 → ∙ ∙ ∙ → Sk → S ′. For each S, S ′ ∈ M, S is an ancestor of S ′, denoted
by S ↘ S ′, if there is a path from S to S ′. Note that the binary relation ↘ is transitive
and (M,↘) is a partially ordered set.
We call each T ∈ M such that |T | = q as an atom of C.17 A choice set S ∈ M
with |S| ≥ q is a prime of C if S has a unique parent, that is, there exists a unique
S ′ ∈ M such that S ′ → S. Let P denote the set of all primes of C. A list of primes
(S1, . . . , Sk) such that S1 → ∙ ∙ ∙ → Sk is called a prime path from S1 to Sk. An atom
of C that is also a prime of C is called a prime atom of C. Let PA denote the set of
all prime atoms of C.
Lemma 1 For each choice set S ∈ A, there exists a unique set S ′ ∈ M such that
C(S ′) = C(S).
Proof. For each S ∈ A, let S ′ =
⋃
{S0 : C(S0) = C(S)}. For each S1, S2 ∈ A, if
C(S1) = C(S2) = C(S), then by path independence, C(S1 ∪ S2) = C(C(S1) ∪ C(S2)),
which implies C(S1 ∪ S2) = C(S). It follows that S ′ is the unique maximal set with
C(S ′) = C(S)
Lemma 2 For each choice set S ∈ M and each a ∈ C(S), we have S \ {a} ∈ M.
Proof. By contradiction suppose there exist S ∈ M and a ∈ C(S) such that S \ {a} /∈
M. Let S ′ ∈ M such that C(S ′) = C(S \ {a}). Since S \ {a} /∈ M, S \ {a} ( S ′.
Now, consider the choice set S ′ ∪ {a}. Note that S ( S ′ ∪ {a}. Moreover, since C is
path independent, C(S ′ ∪ {a}) = C(C(S ′) ∪ {a}). Since C(S ′) = C(S \ {a}), we get
C(S ′∪{a}) = C(C(S \{a})∪{a}). Again by path independence, C(C(S \{a})∪{a}) =
C(S). Thus, we get C(S ′ ∪ {a}) = C(S). Since S ( S ′ ∪ {a}, this contradicts that
S ∈ M.
Lemma 3 If a maximal choice set is a proper subset of another, then there is a path
17An atom in a partially ordered set is an alternative that is minimal among all alternatives that are
unequal to the least alternative. Since for constructing the desired priority profile, the choice sets with
less than q alternatives do not play any role, we consider these choice sets as the least alternatives of
(M,↘). Therefore, we call each choice set T ∈ M with q alternatives an atom of (M,↘).
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from the larger set to the smaller. That is, for each S, S ′ ∈ M such that S ′ ( S, we have
S ↘ S ′.
Proof. Let S, S ′ ∈ M be such that S ′ ( S. Since S, S ′ ∈ M and C is path independent,
there exists a ∈ C(S) \S ′. Suppose otherwise, i.e. suppose that C(S) ⊂ S ′. It follows
from path independence that C(C(S) ∪ S ′) = C(C(S) ∪ C(S ′)) = C(S ∪ S ′) = C(S).
Since C(S) ∪ S ′ = S ′, we get C(S) = C(S ′), which contradicts that S ′ ∈ M. Thus,
there exists a ∈ C(S)\S ′. Now, let S1 = S \{a}. Since S ∈ M, it follows from Lemma
2 that S1 ∈ M. Thus, we get S → S1. To get S2, note that since S ′ ⊂ S1, there exists
b ∈ C(S1) \ S ′. By proceeding similarly we obtain a path (S1, . . . , Sk) from S to S ′.
Lemma 4 Suppose that S ∈ M with |S| ≥ q, and S ∪ {a} is a parent of S. Then, S is
a prime if and only if a is no longer chosen whenever any other alternative is added to
S ∪ {a}, that is for each b /∈ S ∪ {a}, a /∈ C(S ∪ {a, b}).
Proof. (If part) We prove the contrapositive statement. Assume that S ∈ M is not a
prime. Then, there exists b /∈ S ∪{a} such that S ∪{b} is a parent of S. Since S ∪{a}
is a parent of S, by definition, we have S ∪{a} ∈ M. Suppose that a /∈ C(S ∪{a, b}).
Then, since C satisfies substitutability and capacity-filling and S ∪ {a} ⊂ S ∪ {a, b}, it
follows that C(S ∪ {a, b}) = C(S ∪ {b}). But, this contradicts S ∪ {b} ∈ M. Hence
a ∈ C(S ∪ {a, b}).
(Only if part) We prove the contrapositive statement. Suppose that there exists
b /∈ S ∪ {a} such that a ∈ C(S ∪ {a, b}). By Lemma 1, there exists S ′ ∪ {a, b} ∈ M
such that C(S ∪ {a, b}) = C(S ′ ∪ {a, b}), and a, b /∈ S ′. Note that by the choice of S ′,
S ⊂ S ′. Since a ∈ C(S ′ ∪ {a, b}), by Lemma 2, S ′ ∪ {b} ∈ M. Then, since we also
have S ∈ M, it follows from Lemma 3 that S ′ ∪{b} ↘ S. Since a /∈ S ′ ∪{b}, the path
connecting S ′ ∪ {b} to S must reach S via a parent other than S ∪ {a}. Therefore, S
is not a prime.
Lemma 5 Each prime that is not an atom is the parent of a unique prime. That is, for
each S ∈ P such that |S| > q, there exists a unique S ′ ∈ P such that S → S ′.18
18As we emphasize before, this result fails if the choice rule C is path independent but not capacity-
filling. To see this by an example, let A = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and consider the following two priorities:
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Proof. Let S ∈ M with |S| > q. Suppose that S is a prime. Let S ∪ {b∗} be the
unique parent of S. Since b∗ ∈ C(S ∪ {b∗}) and C is capacity-filling, there exists
a ∈ C(S) \ C(S ∪ {b∗}). Consider the choice set S \ {a}. Since S ∈ M with |S| > q,
and a ∈ C(S), it follows from Lemma 2 that S \ {a} ∈ M. It also follows that
S → S \ {a}.
Next, we show that S \ {a} is a prime. By contradiction, suppose S \ {a} is not
a prime. Lemma 4 implies that there exists b /∈ S such that a ∈ C(S ∪ {b}). Since
a /∈ C(S ∪ {b∗}), b 6= b∗. Next, consider the choice set S ∪ {b∗, b}. Since S is a prime,
S ∪ {b∗} → S, and b /∈ S ∪ {b∗}, it follows from Lemma 4 that b∗ /∈ C(S ∪ {b∗, b}).
By path independence, we have C(S ∪ {b∗, b}) = C(C(S ∪ {b}) ∪ {b∗}). Since b∗ /∈
C(S ∪ {b∗, b}), we get C(S ∪ {b∗, b}) = C(S ∪ {b}). Now, since a ∈ C(S ∪ {b}), we
have a ∈ C(S ∪ {b∗, b}). But we also have a /∈ C(S ∪ {b∗}), contradicting that C
satisfies substitutability. Thus, we obtain that S \ {a} is a prime. Since we know that
S → S \ {a}, S \ {a} is a prime child of S.
To see that the prime child is unique, by contradiction, suppose that there exist
distinct a, a′ ∈ C(S) such that S → S \ {a} and S → S \ {a′}, where both S \ {a}
and S \ {a′} are prime. Now, since A is not a prime, S 6= A, and there exists some
x /∈ S. Next, consider S ∪ {x}. It follows from Lemma 4 that a, a′ /∈ C(S ∪ {x}). This
combined with C being capacity-filling implies there exists y ∈ C(S ∪ {x}) \ C(S)
such that y 6= x. This directly contradicts that C satisfies substitutability.
Lemma 6 For each prime S ∈ P that is not an atom, there exists a unique prime path
from S to a prime atom T ∈ P . Moreover, the unique prime path from S to T is included
in any path from A to T . Formally, for each S ∈ P such that |S| > q, there exists a
unique list of primes (S1, . . . , Sk) such that S → S1 ∙ ∙ ∙ → Sk → T , where T is a prime
atom and for each t ∈ {1, . . . , k}, St is included in each path from A to T .
1  2  3  4 and 1 ′ 4 ′ 3 ′ 2. Let C be the maximizer collecting of  and ′. It directly follows
that C is path independent. But, since C(A) = {1} and C(A \ {1}) = {2, 4}, C is not capacity-filling.
To see that C fails to satisfy the conclusion of the Lemma, note that {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3}, {3, 4} are prime
choice sets. However, since both {2, 3, 4} → {3, 4} and {2, 3, 4} → {2, 3}, {2, 3, 4} is the parent of two
primes. Note that A having four alternatives does not play any essential role in this argument, so we
can construct similar examples for any universal set of alternatives.
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Proof. By Lemma 5, there exists a unique prime S1 ∈ P such that S → S1. Applying
Lemma 5 consecutively, there exists a unique list of primes (S1, . . . , Sk) such that
S → S1 ∙ ∙ ∙ → Sk → T , where T is a prime atom. Now, since for each t ∈ {1, . . . , k},
St is prime and T is a prime atom, each St and T have a unique parent. It follows
that for each t ∈ {1, . . . , k}, St must be included in any path that connects A to T .
Lemma 7 Suppose that S is a nonprime maximal choice set with S 6= A, and S ∪ {a}
is its parent. There exists a maximal choice set S ′ ∈ M such that S ∪ {a} ( S ′ and
a ∈ C(S ′).
Proof. Since S 6= A and S is not a prime, there exists b /∈ S ∪{a} such that S ∪{b} →
S. Thus, b ∈ C(S ∪ {b}). Now, consider the choice set S ∪ {a, b}. We show that
a ∈ C(S∪{a, b}). Suppose a /∈ C(S∪{a, b}), then since C satisfies path independence,
C(S ∪ {a, b}) = C(S ∪ {b}), which is a contradiction since S ∪ {b} ∈ M. Hence, a ∈
C(S∪{a, b}). Now, by Lemma 1, there exists S ′ ∈ M such that C(S ′) = C(S∪{a, b}).
Since S ′ is maximal, S ∪ {a, b} ⊂ S ′, which implies S ∪ {a} ( S ′, and a ∈ C(S ′).
Therefore, S ′ is the desired choice set.
Now, we are ready to construct the set of priority orderings for the desired repre-
sentation. For each prime atom T , we pick a path from A to T . Note that there must
be at least one such path since A is the maximal alternative in the choice lattice, and,
by Lemma 3, there is a path from A to any other S ∈ M with |S| ≥ q . We construct
a priority ordering using such a path as follows. Consider a prime atom T ∈ PA. Take
one path from A to T , say, S1, . . . , Sk ∈ M such that A → S1 → ∙ ∙ ∙ → Sk → T . Let
{a1} = A \ S1, {ak+1} = Sk \ T , and for each i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, {ai} = Si−1 \ Si. Note
that by definition of a parent, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, ai is well-defined. Now, let
T be such that for each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, ai T aj if i < j, and assume that any
other remaining alternative is ranked below ak+1 arbitrarily. Thus, we obtain a set of
priority orderings (T )T∈PA by constructing a priority ordering for each prime atom.
Note that the number of priority orderings in (T )T∈PA is equal to the number
of prime atoms. Moreover, we claim that there are at least q priority orderings, or
in other words there are at least q prime atoms. To see this, first note that each
maximal set S ∈ M such that A → S is a prime. Also, since |C(A)| = q, there are q
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such primes. Suppose that the number of prime atoms is less than q. Note that there
are q prime choice sets {A \ {ai}}ai∈C(A) that are children of A. Since by Lemma 6,
there is a prime path from any prime to a prime atom, supposing that the number of
prime atoms is less than q implies there exist two different primes S and S ′ that are
children of A such that prime paths originating from S and S ′ connect them to the
same prime atom T . It follows that these two prime paths originating from S and S ′
merge at some choice set. This implies that the first (largest) choice set contained
by both of these prime paths has two different parents. But, this contradicts that this
choice set is a prime.





First, we show that if (1) holds for each maximal set, then it holds for each
choice set. To see this, suppose that (1) holds for each maximal set. Take any S /∈ M
such that |S| > q. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists S ′ ∈ M such that S ⊂ S ′ and
C(S) = C(S ′). Since (1) holds for S ′, C(S ′) =
⋃
T∈PA
max(S ′,T ). But since S ⊆ S ′
and C(S) = C(S ′), no alternative in S ′ \ S belongs to C(S ′). Thus, there is no
a ∈ S ′ \ S and T ∈ PA such that a = max(S ′,T ). But then,
⋃
T∈PA
max(S ′,T ) =
⋃
T∈PA




Second, we show that (1) holds for each maximal set. Let S ∈ M be such
that |S| > q. First, we show that
⋃
T∈PA
max(S,T ) ⊂ C(S). Let T ∈ PA and let
S1, . . . , Sk ∈ M be such that A → S1 → ∙ ∙ ∙ → Sk → T is the path from A to T
used in the construction of T . Suppose a = max(S,T ). Then, by the construction
of T , there exists t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} such that {a} = St \ St+1, where S0 = A. By the
construction of T , this means for each b ∈ A \ St, b T a. Since a = max(S,T ),
it follows that S ⊆ St. To see that a ∈ C(St), first, note that since C satisfies path
independence, C(St+1 ∪ {a}) = C(C(St+1) ∪ {a}). Since {a} = St \ St+1, we can have
St, St+1 ∈ M only if a ∈ C(St). Now, since C satisfies substitutability and S ⊆ St, we
get a ∈ C(S).




max(S,T ). Suppose that a ∈ C(S). If we can find a set S∗ ∈ M with
a ∈ C(S∗), S ⊂ S∗ and S∗ \ {a} ∈ P , then by Lemma 6 we know there exist a
unique T ∈ PA which can be reached via a unique prime path from S∗ \ {a}. More-
over, again by Lemma 6, the unique prime path from S∗ \ {a} to T is included in any
path from A to T . Now, note that S∗ \ {a} is a prime so any path including S∗ \ {a}
must pass through S∗. Then, S∗ is included in any path from A to T . Thus by con-
struction of T we will have a = max(S∗,T ) = max(S,T ) and this will conclude
the proof.
We conclude by showing that there exists S∗ ∈ M such that a ∈ C(S∗), S ⊂ S∗
and S∗ \ {a} ∈ P . Since S ∈ M and a ∈ C(S), by Lemma 2, S \ {a} ∈ M as well. If
S \ {a} ∈ P , then set S∗ = S and we are done. Suppose that S \ {a} is not a prime.
By Lemma 7 there is S ′ ∈ M such that S ( S ′ and a ∈ C(S ′). If S ′ \ {a} is prime,
then set S∗ = S ′ and we are done. Otherwise, we continue in the same fashion.
Since A is finite and, by definition of a prime, A \ {b} is prime for any b ∈ C(A), then
after a finite number of steps we must eventually come across a set with the desired
properties.
Part ii. Let C be a capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule. Suppose that C
has an MC representation for the priority profile (1, . . . ,m). Consider the set of
prime atoms PA of C. In what follows we show that m ≥ |PA|.
For each T ∈ PA, since T is prime, there exists a unique a /∈ T such that T ∪
{a} → T . Since a ∈ C(T ∪ {a}), there exists T ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that a =
max(T ∪ {a},T ). We will show that for each distinct T, T ′ ∈ PA, T 6=T ′ .
First, we show that, T = {b ∈ A : a T b}. Since a = max(T ∪ {a},T ),
T ⊂ {b ∈ A : a T b}. To see the converse, suppose that there exists b /∈ T such that
a T b. Then a = max(T ∪ {a, b},T ), which implies that a ∈ C(T ∪ {a, b}). This is a
contradiction, since Lemma 4 implies that a is no longer chosen whenever any other
alternative is added to T ∪ {a}. Thus {b ∈ A : a T b} ⊂ T , which implies T = {b ∈
A : a T b}. Now, since |T | = q, T constitutes the bottom-ranked q alternatives at
T . By similar arguments, T ′ constitutes the bottom-ranked q alternatives at T ′ . But
then, T 6=T ′ since T 6= T ′. Hence, prime atoms are associated with distinct priority
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orderings, which implies that m ≥ |PA|.
Remark 1 First, we would like to note that it is not clear if a similar result can
be obtained for all path independent choice rules, in that one of our key observa-
tions, namely Lemma 5, does not hold in the absence of capacity-filling.19 Second, let
us consider the following alternative representation: a choice rule C is maximizer-
collecting* if there exists a priority profile π = (1, . . . ,m) such that for each S ∈ A,
including the choice sets with |S| ≤ q, C(S) =
⋃
i∈{1,...,m} max(S,i). A choice set T
is a critical* set if |T | = q − 1 and there exists a /∈ T such that a is chosen from
T ∪ {a}, but no longer chosen whenever any other alternative is added to T ∪ {a}.
The only difference between a critical set and a critical* set is that a critical set
has q alternatives, whereas a critical* set has q − 1 alternatives. It turns out that
Theorem 1 holds with maximizer-collecting* choice rules and critical* sets.20 We
prefer maximizer-collecting representations since under capacity-filling, asking for a
maximizer-collecting* representation does not change the set of representable rules,
but requires adding, in a sense “unnecessary”, priorities to the representation.
3.1 The case of responsive choice rules
A well-known example of a capacity-filling choice rule that satisfies substitutability is
a responsive choice rule (see Example 1 for the definition). In Theorem 2, we show
that the upper bound on the number of critical sets is achieved by responsive choice
rules. Put differently, the size of the smallest size MC representation rendered by
responsive choice rules is largest among all capacity-filling and substitutable choice
19We presented a path independent choice rule that fails to satisfy Lemma 5 in Footnote 18.
20Our construction in the proof of Theorem 1 can be easily extended to obtain this result. To see this,
consider the paths from the universal set of alternatives to prime atoms. As mentioned in the sketch of
the proof, we obtain the priority orderings out of these paths. For each of these priority orderings, we
are free to order the last q − 1 alternatives. For the extension, consider all the paths that connect the
universal set of alternatives to prime* atoms. Similarly, the priority profile associated with these paths
provides a smallest size maximizer-collecting* representation. For this more stringent representation,
one should additionally be careful about the (n−q)th-ranked alternative at each priority. These longer
paths discipline which alternatives are ranked at the (n − q)th position.
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rules.
Theorem 2 For each capacity constraint q and universal set of n alternatives with n ≥
q + 2,21 each capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule C has an MC representation





. If C is responsive, then C does not have an MC












. Let C be a capacity-filling choice rule that is responsive to the priority
ordering . Let a ∈ A be the (n−1)th-ranked and b be the (n)th-ranked alternative at
. Clearly, a choice set S ∈ A such that |S| = q is a critical set if and only if a /∈ S and










critical sets. The difficult part of
the proof is to show that for an arbitrary capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule,





. To show this, we prove a structural
result, which states that for each capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule and for





maximal choice sets with cardinality k
(in particular, the number of maximal choice sets with a fixed cardinality is invariant
among capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules). We formalize this structural
result in Lemma 8. We denote the collection of maximal choice sets with cardinality
k by Mk.
Lemma 8 Given a capacity q and a universal set of n alternatives, let C be a capacity-
filling and substitutable choice rule. For each k ∈ {q, . . . , n}, the number of maximal











Proof. First, we argue that if for each k ∈ {q, . . . , n} the following identity holds,


















To see this, note that |Mn| = 1 and for k = n − 1, it follows from (2) that
(

























21For n = q + 1, the smallest size MC representation is q. We show this after proving Theorem 3.
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. Proceeding inductively we obtain that |Mk| =
(




what follows we prove that (2) holds in two steps by showing that both sides of the


















. To see this, first, consider K =
{S ∈ A : |S| = k}. Then, consider the partition of K such that for each S, S ′ ∈ K, S






{S ∈ A : |S| = k, C(S ′) ⊂ S ⊂ S ′} (3)
Since for each S ∈ A, there exists a unique S ′ ∈ M such that C(S) = C(S ′) and




{S ∈ A : |S| = k, C(S) = C(S ′)} (4)
Since {Mi}ni=k partitions {S






{S ∈ A : |S| = k, C(S) = C(S ′)} (5)
Finally, note that for each S ′ ∈ M and S ∈ K, if C(S ′) ⊂ S ⊂ S ′, then substitutability
implies that C(S ′) = C(S). Therefore, {S ∈ A : |S| = k, C(S) = C(S ′)} = {S ∈ A :
|S| = k, C(S ′) ⊂ S ⊂ S ′}. This observation together with (5) implies that (3) holds.










|{S ∈ A : |S| = k, C(S ′) ⊂ S ⊂ S ′}| (6)
Next, we argue that for each i ∈ {k, . . . , n}, and S ′ ∈ Mi,






To see this, for each i ∈ {k, . . . , n}, and S ′ ∈ Mi, consider the set {T ⊂ S ′ \ C(S ′) :
|T | = k − q}. Since S ′ ∈ Mi, |S ′ \ C(S ′)| = i − q. It directly follows that |{T ⊂





. To show that (7) holds, we argue that F = {S ∈ A :
|S| = k, C(S ′) ⊂ S ⊂ S ′} is isomorphic22 to F ′ = {T ⊂ S ′ \ C(S ′) : |T | = k − q}. To
22That is, there is a bijection between the two sets.
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see this we define the mapping g such that for each S ∈ F , g(S) = S \ C(S ′). Since
for each S ∈ F , C(S ′) ⊂ S ⊂ S ′ and |S| = k, we have |g(S)| = k − q and g(S) ∈ F ′.
Thus g : F → F ′. Since for each distinct S1, S2 ∈ F , S1 \ C(S ′) 6= S2 \ C(S ′), g is
one-to-one. Since for each T ∈ F ′, g(T ∪ C(S ′)) = T , g is onto. Therefore g is a
bijection between F and F ′. Thus, we obtain that (7) holds. Finally, if we combine




























. To see this consider the set











. Since k > q, for each S ∈ K, there
exists q(S) ∈ S that is the qth highest number in S. Now, consider the partition
of K such that for each S, S ′ ∈ K, S and S ′ belong to the same part if and only if
q(S) = q(S ′). We denote this partition of K by L. Now, note that for each S ∈ K,
q(S) ∈ {k+1−q, . . . , n+1−q}. Next, for each j ∈ {k+1−q, . . . , n+1−q}, we count
the number of S ∈ K such that q(S) = j. If q(S) = j, then there are k − q numbers in


























A standard change of variables with j = i + 1− q here yields that the right-hand










. Thus, we obtain the desired equality.
Now, we prove Theorem 2 using Theorem 1, Lemma 8, and Lemma 4.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let n ≥ q+2 and C be a capacity-filling and substitutable choice
rule. Consider the maximal choice sets with q + 1 alternatives, i.e. Mq+1 = {S ∈ M :
|S| = q+1}. Note that since n ≥ q+2, A /∈ Mq+1. Next, we show that each S ∈ Mq+1
has at most one prime child. By contradiction, suppose there exist S ∈ Mq+1 and
distinct a, b ∈ S such that S \ {a} and S \ {b} are prime children of S. Since S 6= A,
let x /∈ S be such that S ∪ {x} is a parent of S. Now, since S ∪ {x} is a parent of S,
x ∈ C(S ∪ {x}). Since |S ∪ {x}| = q + 2 and C is capacity-filling, |C(S ∪ {x})| = q.
Since C satisfies substitutability, it follows that |C(S ∪ {x}) ∩ C(S)| = q − 1. Since
21
S \ {a} and S \ {b} are prime children of S, by Lemma 4, we have a /∈ C(S ∪ {x})
and b /∈ C(S ∪ {x}), although a, b ∈ C(S) and |C(S) = q|. This contradicts that
|C(S∪{x})∩C(S)| = q−1. Therefore, the number of prime atoms is at most |Mq+1|.










is an upper bound on the number of prime







Let C be a capacity-filling choice rule that is responsive to the priority ordering
. Let a ∈ A be the (n − 1)th-ranked and b ∈ A be the (n)th-ranked alternative at
. Clearly, a set S ∈ A such that |S| = q is a prime atom if and only if a /∈ S and










prime atoms. Then, by Theorem






Responsive choice rules are not unique in having maximum number of critical
sets. To show this, in the next example, we construct a choice rule that is not respon-






Example 4 Let A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and consider the priority profile (α,β,γ ,δ).
Let the capacity be 2 and let C be the capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule
that has an MC representation via the following priority profile.
α β γ δ
1 1 2 2
3 2 3 3
4 4 4 1
5 5 5 6
6 6 6 5
2 3 1 4
The choice lattice (M,↘) associated with C is depicted in Figure 1.23 It directly
follows from the structure of this choice lattice and Lemma 4 that C has 4 critical
sets, namely {1, 6}, {4, 5}, {3, 6}, {2, 6}, which is the upper bound on the number
23Maximal choice sets are denoted by black circles and prime choice sets are denoted by green
circles (gray circles in B&W print).
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of critical sets. Next, we argue that C is not responsive. Suppose otherwise, i.e.,
suppose that C is responsive to a priority ordering . Since C({2, 4, 5, 6}) = {2, 4},
2 and 4 should be the two best -ranked alternatives in this choice set. Let x be
the next best ranked -alternative in the same choice set. Now, we should have
C({2, 5, 6}) \ {2} = C({4, 5, 6}) \ {4} = x. However, this is not the case, since when





{156} {456} {356} {256}
{16} {45} {56} {36} {26}























Figure 1: Lattice representation of the choice rule in Example 4
The following is a natural question.24 For each capacity constraint q and uni-
versal set of n alternatives, does there exist a capacity-filling and substitutable choice
24We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to consider this question.
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rule that is not responsive, but renders a largest size MC-representation? Our next
result shows that the answer is almost always in the affirmative.
Proposition 1 For each capacity constraint q ≥ 2 and universal set of n alternatives







Proof. For each q ≥ 2 and n ≥ q + 2, let A = {a1, . . . , an}. Consider the priority
ordering an  an−1  ∙ ∙ ∙  a1. Let S ′ = {an, . . . , an−q+2}. Note that |S ′| = q − 1.
Since n ≥ q + 2 and q ≥ 2, a1, a2, a3 /∈ S ′. Now, consider the choice rule C such that
for each S ∈ A, if S = S ′ ∪ {a1, a2}, then C(S) = S ′ ∪ {a1}; otherwise, C makes the
same choice as the choice rule that is responsive to . Note that C is capacity-filling,
since |S ′| = q − 1 and a1 6∈ S ′.
To see that C is substitutable, suppose S1, S2 ∈ A such that S1 ( S2. We show
that C(S2) ∩ S1 ⊂ C(S1). There are three cases to consider. Suppose that S2 = S ′ ∪
{a1, a2}. In this case, C(S2) = S ′ ∪ {a1}. Since S1 ( S2 and |S2| = q + 1, |S1| ≤ q.
Then, since C is capacity-filling, C(S1) = S1. Thus, C(S2)∩S1 ⊂ C(S1) = S1. Suppose
that S2 6= S ′ ∪ {a1, a2} and S1 6= S ′ ∪ {a1, a2}. In this case, C is responsive at S1 and
S2. Hence C(S2)∩S1 ⊂ C(S1). Suppose that S2 6= S ′∪{a1, a2} and S1 = S ′∪{a1, a2}.
In this case, substitutability can be violated only if a2 ∈ C(S2). To see that this is not
possible, first note that |S2| ≥ q + 2 since S1 ( S2. Moreover, since C is responsive to
 at S2 and a2 is the second-worst alternative at , we have a1, a2 6∈ C(S2). Hence,
C is substitutable.
Next, we show that C is not responsive. Suppose that C is responsive to a priority
ordering ′. Since a1 ∈ C(S ′ ∪ {a1, a2}) and a2 /∈ C(S ′ ∪ {a1, a2}), we have a1 ′ a2.
Since a1 /∈ C((S ′ \ {an}) ∪ {a1, a2, a3}) and a2 ∈ C((S ′ \ {an}) ∪ {a1, a2, a3}), we have
a2 ′ a1, which is a contradiction. Hence, C is not responsive.





critical sets. To see this, first let T = {S ∈
A : |S| = q − 1, a1, a2 /∈ S, and S 6= S ′}. Now, for each S ∈ T , since C is responsive
to  at S and a2 is the second-worst alternative at , we get a2 ∈ C(S ∪ {a1, a2})
and for each a /∈ S ∪ {a1, a2}, a2 /∈ C(S ∪ {a1, a2, a}). Then, by Lemma 4, for each
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− 1. Next, we show that
S ′ ∪ {a2} is also a prime atom of C. To see this, consider S ′ ∪ {a1, a2}. First note
that S ′ ∪ {a1, a2} ∈ M, since it is the largest choice set in which a1 is chosen. Also,
a1 ∈ C(S ′ ∪ {a1, a2}), but for each a /∈ S ′ ∪ {a1, a2}, since a1 is the worst alternative
at , a1 /∈ C(S ′ ∪ {a1, a2, a}). Then, by Lemma 4, S ′ ∪ {a2} is also a prime atom.
4 Choice rules with representations of size q
Theorem 2 shows that the upper bound on the number of critical sets is achieved by
responsive choice rules. On the other hand, given capacity q, for each capacity-filling
choice rule, the minimum number of priorities that can render an MC representation
is at least q. In this section, we analyze the choice rules that are q-MC. Theorem 3
shows that if the difference between the size of the universal set of alternatives and
the capacity is bigger than two, then there is no capacity-filling choice rule that is
q-MC.
To prove Theorem 3, first, we introduce a key property called strong blocking,
and show that each capacity-filling and q-MC choice rule C satisfies strong blocking.
Given a choice rule C, an alternative a blocks another alternative b in a choice set S
if a is chosen in S and b is not chosen in S, but b is chosen when a is removed from
S, i.e. if a ∈ C(S) and b /∈ C(S), but b ∈ C(S \ {a}).
Strong blocking requires that if an alternative a blocks another in a choice set S
that contains more than q + 1 alternatives, then a continues to block b in any subset
of S that contains more than q + 1 alternatives including a and b. Formally, a choice
rule satisfies strong blocking if the following is satisfied: for each choice set S with
|S| > q + 1, if an alternative a blocks another alternative b in S, then for each S ′ ⊂ S
with a, b ∈ S ′ and |S ′| > q + 1, a blocks b in S ′.
Lemma 9 Let C be a capacity-filling choice rule. If C is q-MC, then C satisfies strong
blocking.
Proof. Consider a capacity-filling choice rule C that is q-MC of the priority profile
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(1, . . . ,q). It is easy to see that C is substitutable. To see that C satisfies strong
blocking, let S ∈ A be such that |S| > q + 1 and a, b ∈ S be such that a blocks b in
S. Since a blocks b in S, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , q} such that a i b and for each
c ∈ S \ {a, b}, b i c. Now, let S ′ ⊂ S be such that a ∈ S ′ and |S ′| > q + 1. Consider
the set S ′′ = S ′ \ {a}. Since |S ′′| > q and b is top ranked by i in S ′′, b ∈ C(S ′′). Since
C must choose q distinct alternatives from S ′′, there cannot be any priority that top
ranks b in S ′′ other than i. Since a i b and a ∈ S ′, there is no priority that top ranks
b in S ′. It directly follows that b /∈ C(S ′), indicating that a blocks b in S ′.
Theorem 3 For each capacity constraint q and universal set of n alternatives, if q > 3
and n > q + 2, then there is no capacity-filling choice rule that is q-MC.
Proof. By contradiction suppose there exists a capacity-filling choice rule C that is
q-MC, where q > 3 and n > q + 2. In what follows, we show that C violates strong
blocking. Consider the universal set of alternatives A, and let C(A) = {a1, . . . , aq}.
Since C is q-MC for a priority profile (1, . . . ,q), assume w.l.o.g. that for each i ∈
{1, . . . , q}, ai = max(A,i).
First, we show that there exist three distinct alternatives {b1, b2, b3} such that
for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, bi = C(A \ {ai}) \ C(A). Since n > q + 2, the number of
alternatives in the set A \ {a1} exceeds the capacity q. Then, since C is q-MC, we
have C(A \ {a1}) =
⋃
i∈{1,...,q} max(A \ {a1},i), which must consist of q distinct
alternatives. Since for each i ∈ {2, . . . , q}, we have ai ∈ C(A \ {a1}), it follows that
there exists b1 ∈ C(A \ {a1}) such that b1 6= ai for each i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Since b1
is the alternative chosen from A \ {a1} by maximizing 1, b1 is the second ranked
alternative in 1. Now, since q > 3, by following analogous arguments for the sets
A \ {a2} and A \ {a3}, we conclude that there exist b2, b3 ∈ A \ {a1, . . . , aq}, such that
b2 is the second ranked alternative in 2 and b3 is the second ranked alternative in
3. Thus, we conclude that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, bi = C(A \ {ai}) \ C(A).
Next, to see that {b1, b2, b3} are pairwise distinct, by contradiction suppose that
at least two of them, w.l.o.g. b1 and b2, are the same. Then, b1 is second ranked in A
both by 1 and 2. Now, consider the choice set A \ {a1, a2}. Since A is the universal
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set of alternatives with |A| = n > q + 2, we have |A \ {a1, a2}| > q. Then, C is q-MC
for the priority profile (1, . . . ,q) implies that C(A \ {a1, a2}) =
⋃
i∈{1,...,q} max(A \
{a1, a2},i). However, since b1 = max(A\{a1, a2},1) and b1 = max(A\{a1, a2},2),
we get |C(A \ {a1, a2})| = q − 1. This contradicts that C is capacity-filling.
Now, consider the choice set S = C(A) ∪ {b1, b2, b3}. Since C satisfies substi-
tutability and capacity-filling, C(S) = C(A). Moreover, since q > 3, there exists
a4 ∈ C(A) \ {a1, a2, a3}. Next, consider the choice set S \ {a4}. Since C is capacity-
filling, C(S \ {a4})∩ {b1, b2, b3} 6= ∅. Suppose w.l.o.g. that b1 ∈ C(S \ {a4}). It follows
that a4 blocks b1 in S. Now, consider the choice set S \ {a1}. We have S \ {a1} ⊂ S
and |S \ {a1}| = q + 2 > q + 1. But, since b1 ∈ C(A \ {a1}) and S \ {a1} ⊂ A \ {a1},
substitutability implies that b1 ∈ C(S \ {a1}). Thus, a4 fails to block b1 in S \ {a1}, in-
dicating that C violates strong blocking. By Lemma 9 this contradicts that C is q-MC.
If n = q + 2 or n = q + 1, then any capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule
is q-MC. To see this, first suppose that n = q + 2. By Theorem 2, any capacity-filling
and substitutable choice rule has an MC representation of a size less than or equal to
q, implying that any capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule is q-MC.25
Now, suppose that n = q + 1. Let C be a capacity-filling and substitutable choice
rule. Note that, by capacity-filling, C must reject a unique alternative from the choice
set A and must accept all alternatives from any other choice set. Let {x} = A \ C(A)
and A = {a1, . . . , aq, x}. Consider a priority profile π = (1, . . . ,q) such that for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, ai = max(A,i). Note that C has an MC representation of size q
for the priority profile π.
Note that, given any capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule C, we are able
to calculate q∗(C) which is the minimum number of priority orderings required to
represent C. A related question is the following: Given (n, q), what is the number
minC∈H q
∗(C), where H is the set of all capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules?
It follows from our Theorem 3 that if q > 3 and n > q + 2, then minC∈H q∗(C) > q.
25Note that there is at least one such choice rule since any responsive choice rule is capacity-filling
and substitutable.
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However, we leave the exact calculation of minC∈H q∗(C) as an open question.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules. De-
spite all their eminence for applications, the size of a smallest size MC representation
of a capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule and how to construct such a rep-
resentation had been unknown. In our Theorem 1, we addressed this problem, by
constructively proving that the number of critical sets determines the smallest size
maximizer collecting representation for each capacity-filling and substitutable choice
rule.
Our Theorem 1 together with the construction in its proof is of interest for
applications in which capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules are adopted. A
prominent example is the school choice problem, in which each school specifies its
admission policy in the form of a capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule that
reconciles the objective of admitting students with high exam scores and affirmative
policies for females, ethnic minorities, or neighborhood students. A curious question
is what is the simplest way of communicating the choice rule to the public. Since
such a choice rule can be represented as an MC choice rule, it is natural to assume
that as the size of this representation decreases, the communication can be easier.
Our Theorem 1 and the related construction in its proof shows us how to choose the
priority orderings so as to obtain a smallest size MC representation.
Well-known examples of capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules are re-
sponsive choice rules. In Theorem 2, we show that the size of the smallest size
MC representation rendered by responsive choice rules is largest among all capacity-
filling and substitutable choice rules. We have also analyzed q-MC choice rules that
are easy to communicate. An impossibility result follows from this characterization:
if the difference between the size of the universal set of alternatives and the capacity
is bigger than two, then there is no q-MC choice rule. This result and Theorem 2
indicate that using an MC representation may not be the easiest way to communicate
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every capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule.
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